Financial distress, short sale constraints, and mispricing
Pacific Basin Finance Journal Volume 53, February 2019, Pages 94-111   Kim, D.(a), Lee, I.(b), Na, H.(c) a Korea University Business School, Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, 02841, South Korea b The Bank of Korea, 39 Namdaemun-ro, Jung-gu, Seoul, 04531, South Korea c Department of Finance and Law, College of Business and Economics, California State University, Los Angeles, United States   Abstract View references (81) This paper specifically examine how the extent of the distress puzzle differs according to the degree of mispricing and short sale constraints. We find that the distress puzzle observed for overpriced stocks, not for underpriced stocks, becomes insignificant after adjustment for short sale constraints due to an asymmetric pricing effect of short sale constraints only on the short-leg side of distress. However, after adjustment for arbitrage risk, the distress puzzle remains unchanged. These results indicate that the distress puzzle is mainly attributable to short sale constraints, rather than other limits-to-arbitrages such as arbitrage risk, which has a bi-lateral pricing effect on both short-leg and long-leg sides of distress. To mitigate a possible endogeneity problem relation among financial distress, mispricing, and short sale constraints, we measure these variables with different timing. © 2018 Elsevier B.V. keywords Asymmetric pricing effect; Benchmark-adjusted returns; Degree of mispricing; Financial distress puzzle; Short sale constraints;  
2019.02.07
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Stuck between a rock and a hard place: Contrasting upward and downward effects of leaders’ ingratiation
Personnel Psychology Volume 71, Issue 4, Winter 2018, Pages 495-518   Kim, J.K.(a), LePine, J.A.(a), Chun, J.U.(b) a Arizona State University, United States b Korea University, South Korea Abstract Research indicates that leaders who engage in upward ingratiation, a specific form of impression management, develop positive relationships with their bosses, which in turn enhances leaders’ chances of achieving success at work. However, a more complete understanding of leaders’ ingratiation requires recognition that leaders have multiple audiences and that there may be negative unintended consequences of this behavior to at least one of these audiences. Specifically, upward ingratiation may reduce subordinates’ willingness to contribute to the organization through effective performance because it diminishes relationship quality between leaders and subordinates. To explore this issue, we develop and test a multilevel model that contrasts effects of leaders’ upward ingratiation on leader- and subordinate-level outcomes through the quality of social exchange in the corresponding relationship. We test our predictions by conducting a multiwave, multisource field study with a sample of 91 leaders, 91 bosses, and 215 subordinates in South Korea. Our findings reveal that upward ingratiation is positively associated with indicators of leaders’ intrinsic and extrinsic success because it enhances leader–boss exchange quality (LLX). In contrast, leaders’ upward ingratiation negatively influences subordinates’ job performance because it diminishes leader–subordinate exchange quality (LMX). We also find that subordinates’ perceptions of leaders’ political skill mitigate the negative indirect relationship between upward ingratiation and subordinates’ job performance via LMX quality, and that our hypotheses apply to ingratiation but not to other forms of impression management. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings in relation to ingratiation specifically and to impression management more generally. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.  
2018.11.20
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CEO career horizon, corporate governance, and real options: The role of economic short-termism
Strategic Management Journal Volume 39, Issue 10, October 2018, Pages 2703-2725   Lee, J.M.(a), Park, J.C.(b), Folta, T.B.(c) a Management Department, Korea University Business School, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea b Finance Department, Muma College of Business, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, United States c Management Department, School of Business, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, United States Abstract Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short-termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long-term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self-seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking-behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long-term incentives and institutional investors. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Keywords agency theory; CEO career horizon; economic short-termism; real options; strategic flexibility;
2018.10.01
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The Moderating Role of Power Distance on the Reaction of Consumers to the CEO as a Spokesperson During a Product Harm Crisis: Insights From China and South Korea
​Journal of International Management Volume 24, Issue 3, September 2018, Pages 215-221   Laufer, D.(a), Garrett, T.C.(b), Ning, B.(a) a School of Marketing and International Business, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, 6140, New Zealand b Korea University Business School, Korea University, Anam-Dong, Seongbuk-Gu, Seoul, 02841, South Korea Abstract During a crisis the corporate message is not the only issue facing the company. The role of the spokesperson is an under-researched area which is examined in this paper. In studies conducted in South Korea and China we examine the reaction of consumers to the CEO as a spokesperson during a product harm crisis. We find in both countries that consumer responses to the CEO was contingent on the consumers’ level of power distance. When consumers had high levels of power distance they had higher future purchase intentions when compared with consumers who had low levels of power distance when the CEO was the spokesperson during the crisis. In addition, in a study conducted in South Korea we find that higher levels of power distance generate increased levels of brand trust when the CEO is the spokesperson, which in turn increases future purchase intentions. Our studies have important theoretical and managerial implications which are discussed in the paper. © 2017 Keywords CEO; Crisis communication; Management; Power distance;
2018.09.01
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